A Reflection on Al-Bīrūnī’s Approach to Patañjali’s Sūtras

Borzou Ghaderi

Abstract: Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī’s Patanjal al-Hindī is a unique intellectual endeavor that bridges Islamic-Iranian and Indian philosophical traditions. His treatise is not merely a translation of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras but an interpretative work that recontextualizes Yogic concepts within the framework of Islamic metaphysics and epistemology. This study, based on a broader research project that includes a complete Persian translation and comparative analysis of Patanjal al-Hindī, examines six selected question-and-answer dialogues from al-Bīrūnī’s text in relation to their Sanskrit counterparts. The research highlights the methodological rigor of al-Bīrūnī, who transformed Patañjali’s aphorisms into structured discourses, making them more accessible to an Arabic-speaking audience. This comparative study demonstrates that despite structural differences, significant philosophical and mystical intersections exist between these traditions. It also underscores al-Bīrūnī’s role in fostering cross-cultural intellectual exchanges, providing valuable insights into medieval Islamic encounters with Indian thought.

Keywords: Al-Bīrūnī, Patañjali, Yoga Sūtras, Islamic Philosophy, Indian Mysticism, Comparative Mysticism, Intellectual History

  1. INTRODUCTION

The present study aims to reconstruct the meticulous effort and intellectual precision of Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī in presenting a significant part of Indian mystical literature, which facilitated an encounter between the Islamic-Iranian and Indian mystical traditions. His treatise, Patanjal al-Hindī fī al-khalāṣ min al-irtibāk[1], exemplifies the pinnacle of his scholarly accuracy and interpretative sophistication, bringing a deeply meaningful account of an unfamiliar language and culture into the intellectual landscape of his era.

The Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali is a collection of cryptic aphorisms on self-realization, compiled by the sage Patañjali. It encapsulates centuries of introspection, meditation, and philosophical inquiry within a series of profound yet concise statements. Al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation, while distinct from traditional Indian exegeses, offers a structured and rational perspective, reflecting the intellectual disposition of a society that sought to integrate even the most esoteric revelations within a logical framework. To facilitate comprehension, al-Bīrūnī transformed these abstract aphorisms into a structured format of question-and-answer dialogues, wherein the inquiring figure—perhaps a reflection of his own inquisitive spirit—engages systematically with metaphysical and spiritual concepts.

The compilation of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras dates back to several centuries before the Common Era. For at least four centuries after its composition, no known commentaries existed, although the text itself appears to have been central to the spiritual practices of Indian ascetics. It was only in 450 CE that Vyāsa composed the first known commentary on the text, marking the beginning of a long tradition of exegetical works by Hindu philosophers and monks. However, the first non-Indian rendition of this seminal text emerged through al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic translation, Patanjal al-Hindī fī al-khalāṣ min al-irtibāk. Remarkably, this remained the only known translation outside India for centuries. In his introduction, al-Bīrūnī emphasizes that his motivation for translating the text was to present it as a profound spiritual offering from the intellectual elite of India to Arabic-speaking seekers of mystical knowledge.

It appears that al-Bīrūnī’s translation sparked discussions among Muslim mystics and Sufis during his lifetime. In Taḥqīq mā li-l-Hind, he acknowledges that:

“Through the teachings of Patañjali, the Sufis became preoccupied with truth and the means of attaining it.[2]”

This influence may extend even to the works of Avicenna, particularly in the tenth section (Namat) of his al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt, where he discusses the miraculous abilities of mystics. Given the thematic similarities between this discussion and the third section of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras, it is conceivable that Avicenna was indirectly influenced by al-Bīrūnī’s translation.

For centuries, al-Bīrūnī’s treatise remained forgotten until the German orientalist J.W. Hauer rediscovered a manuscript of the text in Istanbul in 1930. He introduced it as a newly found version of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras in the German journal of Oriental Studies [1]. This discovery attracted the attention of several other scholars, including Louis Massignon, who referenced the text in the 1951 commemorative volume dedicated to al-Bīrūnī [2]. However, the most significant modern engagement with the text came through the work of Helmut Ritter, who meticulously read, analyzed, and published the Arabic text in the German journal Oriens in 1956 [3]. Later, in 2001, Manouchehr Sadoughi Soha revisited Ritter’s edited Arabic text, republishing it in Tehran and making it accessible to Persian-speaking scholars [4]. Unfortunately, Sadoughi Soha was unable to locate the original manuscript housed in the Köprülü Library in Istanbul (cataloged as MS 1589) and thus relied entirely on Ritter’s transcription. Despite extensive efforts, I, too, was unable to obtain the original manuscript. Nonetheless, given Ritter’s expertise, coupled with Sadoughi Soha’s meticulous analysis, their work provided a reliable source for my own study.

The first comparative study of al-Bīrūnī’s treatise with the original Sanskrit Yoga Sūtras was conducted in 1966 by Pines and Gelblum, though they limited their analysis to only the first section of the text [5]. Subsequent efforts in 1977, 1983, and 1988 extended the comparative analysis to the remaining three sections of al-Bīrūnī’s treatise [6-8].

This article is derived from my broader research project, in which I translated the entirety of al-Bīrūnī’s treatise into Persian and conducted a comparative analysis with the Sanskrit Yoga Sūtras. This study, published in 2011 in Tehran under the title Risāla-yi Pātañjal [9], includes translations of the introduction and the first four sections of al-Bīrūnī’s text from Arabic to Persian, alongside a direct translation of the Yoga Sūtras from Sanskrit to Persian. Furthermore, it provides a comparative analysis of these translations against various traditional and contemporary exegeses of Patañjali’s work, an investigation into al-Bīrūnī’s approach to Indian philosophy and Indology, and an exploration of the philosophical intersections between Patañjali’s mysticism and Islamic-Iranian Sufism.

The present article is structured around three core objectives:

  1. To highlight al-Bīrūnī’s contribution to Indology and his profound knowledge of Indian mystical thought, situating his work within the broader intellectual landscape of cross-cultural philosophical transmission.
  2. To provide a critical analysis of al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic rendition of the Yoga Sūtras (translated from Sanskrit), including its translation from Arabic to Persian, alongside a direct translation of the Yoga Sūtras from Sanskrit to Persian. This comparative study examines the interpretative discrepancies and conceptual nuances between al-Bīrūnī’s rendering and the original Sanskrit text.
  3. To draw a comparative philosophical analysis between the mystical doctrines of Patañjali and the mystical traditions of Islamic Sufism, identifying both their parallels and divergences.

As previously noted, the primary text used for this translation was the version edited and published by Manouchehr Sadoughi Soha, which itself is based on Helmut Ritter’s critical edition. In instances where the original manuscript contained illegible or damaged words, Ritter and Sadoughi Soha reconstructed the most plausible readings. In my analysis, whenever such reconstructions appeared ambiguous, I referred to the original Sanskrit Yoga Sūtras to determine the most contextually appropriate rendering.

Furthermore, after each of al-Bīrūnī’s question-answer dialogues, I have provided a detailed commentary that primarily focuses on aligning these passages with the corresponding Sūtras from Patañjali’s text, upon which al-Bīrūnī seemingly based his Arabic rendition. In addition, I have sought to elucidate the meaning of these passages by drawing upon a range of interpretative sources, including both traditional exegeses and modern scholarly analyses. This comparative approach allows for a more precise understanding of the interpretative nuances in al-Bīrūnī’s translation and the broader philosophical implications of his work.

Additionally, it appears that some pages of the manuscript of al-Bīrūnī’s text were damaged by termites, causing certain words to be completely lost with no trace remaining. In such cases, I have made every effort to reconstruct a comprehensible translation based on the surrounding context and in alignment with the original Sūtras. Any words or phrases added for clarity have been placed in quotation marks to distinguish them from the original text. Likewise, where I had to infer missing content based on a limited number of surviving words, those reconstructions have also been enclosed in quotation marks.

By employing a meticulous comparative approach, this study attempts to provide a clearer understanding of al-Bīrūnī’s interpretative choices and their alignment with the Yoga Sūtras. The following sections will present a detailed examination of six selected question-answer dialogues from the first section of al-Bīrūnī’s treatise, juxtaposed with their corresponding Sanskrit Sūtras and a critical analysis of their philosophical significance.

  1. THE Significance and Characteristics of Al-Bīrūnī’s Work

The study and analysis of Hindu thought and philosophy have long captured the attention of various Muslim intellectuals, including Iran-Shahri, Al-Bīrūnī, Mīr Fendereskī, and Dārā Shikoh. Each of these scholars adopted a unique perspective on India, its civilization, and its spiritual traditions. However, regarding the distinct outlook and approach of Al-Bīrūnī in the formation of Patanjal al-Hindī, the following points merit special attention:

The Unique Question-and-Answer Structure

Al-Bīrūnī’s translation adopts a question-and-answer format, which appears to be an original innovation, as other commentators before him had not used this method. The original Sanskrit text of the Sūtras does not follow a question-and-answer structure. As Al-Bīrūnī himself states in the introduction to his translation, he devised this approach to facilitate the understanding and transmission of the text’s concepts:

“The books of the Hindus are composed in specific metrical forms and require interpretation and commentary. Thus, their full transmission is difficult… For this reason, in translating this treatise, I was compelled to arrange the passages and essential meanings in an expanded explanatory manner, adopting the style of question and answer.”

(Introduction to Patanjal al-Hindī)

 

Comparison with Vivarana

It is noteworthy that the Vivarana commentary, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya, also employs a question-and-answer format to explain the Sūtras. However, the original Sanskrit text of this commentary was first discovered, edited, and published in 1952 in Madras by two Indian scholars, P.S. Rama Sastri and S.R. Krishnamurti Sastri [10]. Based on textual evidence, they attributed the work to Śaṅkarācārya, which, if correct, would date the Vivarana to the 7th century CE, making it even older than the well-known commentary by Vācaspati Miśra and the first major exegesis after Vyāsa’s. This attribution has been supported by prominent Indologists such as Wilhelm Halbfass[11], S. Mayeda[12], and H. Nakamura [13], whereas Georg Feuerstein has suggested that the text was compiled in the 14th century [14].

Nevertheless, it is clear that the Vivarana could not have served as a model for Al-Bīrūnī, for two reasons: First, as previously stated, Al-Bīrūnī explicitly attributes the question-and-answer format of his translation to himself. He may have drawn inspiration from texts such as the Bhagavad Gītā, which he greatly admired, and which is composed in a dialogue format between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa.

Second, the content and structure of the Vivarana and Al-Bīrūnī’s work are significantly different. Had Al-Bīrūnī encountered the Vivarana, its influence would have been evident in his translation, yet no such trace exists. Moreover, the number of question-and-answer exchanges in the two texts varies considerably. While Al-Bīrūnī structured the entire first section (Samādhi Pāda) into twenty-three questions and answers, the Vivarana contains nineteen questions for the explanation of just the first Sūtra.

Guiding the Reader Through the Sūtras

The questions formulated by Al-Bīrūnī provide a unique framework for understanding and engaging with the Yoga Sūtras. They function as guiding beacons for a seeker lost in the vast and cryptic desert of the Sūtras, demonstrating Al-Bīrūnī’s remarkable ingenuity in translating and narrating this philosophical text.

Expanding on the Original Text

Al-Bīrūnī’s question-and-answer format is not merely a faithful translation of Patañjali’s Sūtras; rather, it includes explanatory passages where he deemed further elaboration necessary. Whenever he identified ambiguities or conceptual difficulties, he introduced additional independent questions and answers to clarify the subject matter. For example, the thirteenth question in his translation, which discusses the difference between the Supreme Being (God) and a liberated sage (a human who has attained self-realization), does not appear in the original Sūtras. However, due to the description of the enlightened being in Patañjali’s work, Al-Bīrūnī foresaw the potential for misinterpretation and inserted this discussion to assist readers in avoiding confusion. This approach continues throughout his translation, demonstrating that he was highly precise and sensitive in conveying the content of the Sūtras to his audience. He was deeply concerned about ensuring the faithful transmission of the text and was even wary of the possible formation of ideological deviations among his readers.

Selective Translation and Silent Disagreements

Al-Bīrūnī’s question-and-answer format serves primarily as a translation and narration of Patañjali’s Sūtras from Sanskrit into Arabic, while also aiming to clarify and elucidate their meanings. Although he appears to disagree with certain concepts presented in the Sūtras—as can be inferred from his introduction and conclusion—he nonetheless maintains strict fidelity in translating the text and refrains from offering explicit criticism or refutation. In other words, apart from his introductory and concluding remarks, he does not challenge or critique the content of the Sūtras.

However, it is important to note that al-Bīrūnī did not translate the entirety of the Sūtras; rather, he selectively rendered their content, leaving certain passages untranslated. For example, he omits the stages of Nirbija Samādhi (seedless absorption), which appear in the first section (Samādhi Pāda), disregarding them entirely. This omission raises the possibility that he intentionally left out portions of the text with which he disagreed.

Beyond this, in the third section of the text, al-Bīrūnī includes data regarding the structure of the universe and realms of existence, drawing from perspectives found in various religious and philosophical traditions. While he had previously engaged with similar discussions in Taḥqīq mā li-l-Hind (often citing sources directly), he does not appear to contest the core arguments of Patañjali’s Sūtras. Instead, he views these teachings as precious insights that should be purified of mythical embellishments and illogical narratives, presenting them in a more structured and rational framework.

Selective Emphasis and Omission in the Translation of the Yoga Sūtras

Al-Bīrūnī’s translation encompasses all four sections of the Yoga Sūtras. However, he selectively elaborates on passages he deems significant, expanding upon them through multiple question-and-answer dialogues. Conversely, he omits certain passages that he finds obscure or inconsistent with rational principles. Additionally, he condenses lengthy passages related to practical yogic disciplines, summarizing them within a single question-and-answer exchange.

For instance, he consolidates Sūtras 28 to 55 of the second section (Sādhana Pāda), which pertain to Yogic practice and discipline, into a single, extensive question-and-answer passage. Meanwhile, he dedicates eight separate question-and-answer dialogues (Questions 11 to 18) to the concept of divine unity (Tawḥīd), whereas the original Sanskrit text allocates only six Sūtras to this subject.

Furthermore, he omits Sūtras 55 and 56 of the first section (Samādhi Pāda), which are among the most cryptic and esoteric verses of the Sanskrit text. These passages may hint at a doctrine of non-dualism (advaita) or absolute monism, a concept that he notably chooses not to translate.

Reliance on Vyāsa’s Yoga Bhāṣya in Translation

Based on the analogies and examples presented throughout his question-and-answer format, it is evident that the translation is fundamentally derived from the Yoga Bhāṣya, the first known commentary on the Yoga Sūtras, authored by Vyāsa in 450 CE. For instance, the metaphor found in Sūtra 13 of the third section (Vibhūti Pāda) of Vyāsa’s commentary is identical to one used by Al-Bīrūnī.

The present author contends that Al-Bīrūnī translated the Yoga Bhāṣya itself rather than solely the Yoga Sūtras. The brief explanatory notes inserted by Vyāsa after each aphorism in Sanskrit may not have been distinguishable to Al-Bīrūnī as separate from Patañjali’s original statements. A strong indication of this is found in Al-Bīrūnī’s own introduction, where he apologizes for the brevity of his translation compared to the original Sanskrit text. He attributes this conciseness to the omission of certain linguistic embellishments, assuring the reader that he has conveyed the core meanings with accuracy and integrity:

“Let no one assume that I have fallen short in conveying the intended meaning. Rather, I have pruned this treatise of unnecessary burdens [linguistic and rhetorical flourishes] in translation.”

However, in reality, Patañjali’s original Sūtras are much shorter than Al-Bīrūnī’s Arabic text, indicating that his translation was likely based on Vyāsa’s commentary rather than on Patañjali’s work in isolation.

Al-Bīrūnī as a Cross-Cultural Mediator

Unlike other Persianate Indologists, such as Iran-Shahri and Mīr Fendereskī, Al-Bīrūnī was not merely a translator of Hindu thought for the Islamic world; he was also a conduit of Islamic knowledge for Hindus. In Taḥqīq mā li-l-Hind, he describes how he even assisted Hindu scholars in rationalizing the philosophical foundations of their own sacred texts, to the extent that some accused him of sorcery and enchantment.

III. Translation and Comparative Analysis of Six Questions and Answers from the First Section

First Question and Answer

A wandering ascetic, traveling through deserts and wilderness, approached Patañjali and asked him: “I have examined the writings and sayings of the ancients regarding things that are beyond the senses, and I have found their words and accounts [regarding imperceptible beings] to be based on weak reasoning. Their arguments are so frail that [the intellect] becomes entangled in numerous doubts, and these proofs neither lead to evident unveiling nor grant the serene certainty (thalj al-yaqīn). They fail to provide any decisive evidence that could lead to deliverance from the bondage of nature. So, can you guide me with sound reasoning and proofs [so that I may comprehend the imperceptible] and be freed from doubt and uncertainty?”

Patañjali replied: “Yes, it is possible, and I shall convey [your desired truth] in brief and concise words—words few in number yet vast in meaning, provided they are grasped through proper reasoning. For when a person seeks to expand upon discourse, such expansion does not necessarily lead to completeness and perfection. Rather, it hastens weariness, induces vexation, and ultimately leads to the abandonment of the subject altogether.

Since you have asked, then listen attentively: your goal [liberation from the bonds of nature and the knowledge of the imperceptible] depends upon an action, a discipline that has its own causes, [which, when undertaken], yields a result, and has an agent responsible for its fulfillment. It is imperative that you grasp each of these elements in their entirety, critically examine the various discourses on this subject, and cast aside erroneous views.

As for the practice required for liberation, it is of two kinds: one consists of effort and struggle, while the other is akin to renunciation and detachment. When you attain this discipline [which comprises both action and abstention] and acquire knowledge thereof, the result of your knowledge and renunciation shall enable you to reclaim and preserve what has been dispersed outwardly from within you. At present, you are engaged with everything except yourself! [Thus, you must] gather the faculties of your soul (nafs), which have clung to externals, and direct each of them toward its rightful function. This endeavor [the subjugation of the soul’s faculties] encompasses both knowledge and action.”

 

Commentary on the First Question and Answer

  1. The first question and response presented by al-Bīrūnī reflect an intense yearning to transcend the confines of nature and move beyond the realm of sensory perception. The crucial point here is that the questioner is not merely seeking intellectual satisfaction or a logically sound answer to his inquiry. Beyond the explicit themes that will emerge in later dialogues, even within this question-and-answer exchange, the path to certainty is described as a combination of knowledge and practice, which clearly does not refer to mere syllogistic reasoning. Additionally, the reference to the stage of Thalj al-Yaqīn (Certitude of Tranquility) further supports this assertion. Islamic mystical and philosophical tradition, particularly within Sufi epistemology and the teachings of Islamic sages, the attainment of perfect certainty and the transition from doubt occur in four stages: ʻIlm al-Yaqīn (Certitude of Knowledge), ʻAyn al-Yaqīn (Certitude of Vision), Ḥaqq al-Yaqīn (Certitude of Truth), and Thalj al-Yaqīn (Certitude of Tranquility), also referred to as Bard al-Yaqīn (Coolness of Certainty).

A simple analogy for these levels of certainty can be drawn from recognizing the presence of water. If one perceives multiple indications of water—such as the sound of flowing water—one becomes assured of its existence; this is ʻIlm al-Yaqīn. Upon directly witnessing a river or stream, one attains ʻAyn al-Yaqīn. Drinking the water corresponds to Ḥaqq al-Yaqīn, and the cooling sensation and deep satisfaction derived from drinking it represent Thalj al-Yaqīn.

  1. The explanation given by al-Bīrūnī through Patañjali—that verbosity induces weariness and does not necessarily illuminate the heart and mind, and may even cause further confusion—aligns precisely with the very nature of the Sūtra (सूत्र). The Sanskrit word Sūtra shares etymological roots with the Latin Suturs and the English Suture, meaning a thread or string. In Indian philosophical and mystical traditions, Sūtra signifies a method of threading together spiritual concepts and practical guidelines for attaining truth.

Historically, Indian sages and philosophers employed three distinct linguistic frameworks to articulate their teachings:

  1. Mythological Language: This language conveys divine narratives in elaborate detail, depicting gods and their attributes. It represents the most ancient mode of expression and is found in the Vedas, where essential teachings for humanity are transmitted in mythological form, as though spoken by the gods.
  2. The Language of the Sūtras: The figures who employed this language remain enshrouded in mystery, as they focus on delineating the overarching structure of existence and self-realization. However, individuals must navigate their own paths based on the general principles laid out in these texts. These cryptic statements (Sūtras) serve as guiding beacons for seekers along the path.
  3. The Language of the Tantras: This linguistic mode does not concern itself with metaphysical discussions about ultimate reality. Instead, it is highly technical and encompasses a broad array of esoteric techniques and disciplines. The Tantras claim that their methods have distinct psychological and mental effects that aid in self-exploration. In contrast to the Sūtras, which present abstract metaphysical principles, the Tantras provide practical methods for internal transformation. Discussions on the secrets of existence and ultimate truth are considered secondary to spiritual discipline and inner purification.

Since the spiritual states and mystical experiences of an individual cannot easily be articulated, whenever they are verbalized, they inevitably require intricate linguistic systems.

  1. The practical approach outlined in this question-and-answer exchange encapsulates key concepts from at least the first six aphorisms of the Samādhi Pāda section of the Yoga Sūtras. The idea that the senses and faculties of the soul are captivated by external objects—scattered and drawn toward the outside world—is discussed in the second and third aphorisms of the first section of the Sūtras. Furthermore, the necessity of abhyāsa (disciplined effort and practice) and vairāgya (dispassion) as the dual means for recollecting and reintegrating the dispersed faculties of consciousness into the heart is explicitly stated in aphorisms 12–15 of Samādhi Pāda.

Second Question and Answer

The inquirer asked: If a person preserves the faculties of the soul within themselves and prevents them from becoming scattered, what will their state be?

The respondent said: When the soul’s attachments to external things are severed, and its inclination to grasp onto what lies outside itself is abandoned, then the individual is no longer bound by the chains and fetters of natural captivity. However, they are still not fully deserving of liberation and salvation, for their soul remains confined within the body.

Commentary on the Second Question and Answer

  1. The process of withdrawing the soul’s faculties from external objects and redirecting them inward is designated as nirodha in the terminology of the Sūtras. There has been considerable scholarly debate regarding the precise meaning of this term. Generally, two distinct translations of nirodha have been proposed in English:
  • Control, Restriction
  • Cessation, Suspension, Annihilation

The significance of this debate in the interpretation of the Sūtras lies in its profound metaphysical implications. If nirodha is understood as total cessation and annihilation, then Patañjali’s metaphysical system would be grounded in non-dualism (advaita), implying a monistic worldview. However, if nirodha is merely control and restriction, then the distinction between the subject (the agent of perception) and the object (the external referent of the soul’s faculties) remains intact, reinforcing a dualist (dvaita) metaphysical stance.

Notably, Georg Feuerstein emphasizes interpreting nirodha as “control,” thereby advocating for a dualist reading of Patañjali’s system [14], while Ian Whicher supports a non-dualist interpretation, associating nirodha with the concept of total cessation and ontological absorption [15].

  1. In Yogic texts and teachings, different psychological states preceding the attainment of nirodha are identified, namely: mūḍha, kṣipta, vikṣipta, ekāgra, and finally, nirodha itself. Although this classification is absent from the Yoga Sūtras, Vyāsa refers to them in his seminal commentary [16].
  • Mūḍha represents the latent potential of the psyche. According to Vedic teachings, at this stage, the mind remains under the influence of tama-guna (the quality of inertia and darkness). This phase can be compared to the potential intellect (ʻaql hayūlānī) in Peripatetic (Mashshā’ī) philosophy, which has yet to be imprinted with intellectual forms.
  • Kṣipta describes a state of mental restlessness and instability, dominated by Raja Guna (the quality of energy and passion). This state exhibits an inclination toward acquiring knowledge, making it comparable to the dispositional intellect (ʻaql bi-l-malakah).
  • Vikṣipta is the condition in which the human soul has attained cognitive expansion through reflection and reasoning. It represents the psychological state of a mature individual who has transcended vegetative and animalistic existence (analogous to the early cognitive stages of infancy and childhood). This phase can be likened to the actual intellect (ʻaql bi-l-fiʻl). It is from this stage that Yogic discipline formally commences.
  • Ekāgra is the state of one-pointed concentration, where the soul’s faculties achieve an unwavering focus. In this state, the psyche is accompanied by a profound sense of inner tranquility, purity, and detachment, directly grasping whatever it seeks to understand. To some extent, this stage parallels the acquired intellect (ʻaql mustafād) in Islamic Peripatetic thought.
  • Nirodha is the stage in which consciousness fluctuations and the oscillations of the three gunas (sattva, rajas, tamas) are completely pacified. Consequently, this state is referred to as tri-guna-tīta (beyond the three gunas). Here, no natural phenomena remain objects of cognition; rather, the only subject of awareness is absolute being.

Beyond its general definition, nirodha itself is further classified into four hierarchical stages in Yogic mystical teachings:

  • Vṛtti-Nirodha: This signifies the cessation of the fluctuations of consciousness that are stimulated by external cause. At this stage, the individual is no longer disturbed by external stimuli, and their soul’s faculties cease engaging with objects beyond themselves. In Sufi terminology, this state corresponds to qatʻ al-ḥiss (withdrawal of the senses), where the faculties of perception are drawn entirely inward.
  • Pratyaya-Nirodha: Here, even internal cognitive constructs cease. The term pratyaya is etymologically derived from prati, i, and ālambana, meaning “to advance toward fundamental realities.” Once external distractions are eliminated, internal thought processes still persist. This stage represents the cessation of mental concepts and a further step toward complete absorption in the inner reality.
  • Saṃskāra-Nirodha: Even after consciousness fluctuations and cognitive constructs have subsided, the residual mental impressions (saṃskāras) remain. At this stage, these subconscious imprints or subliminal-activators are also dissolved, allowing for a more profound state of detachment.
  • Sarva-Nirodha: The final stage, characterized by absolute stillness and total absorption into the Supreme Reality (paramātman), where the soul’s faculties transcend all dualistic modes of perception.

 

Third Question and Answer

The inquirer asked: If the [soul] is in neither of the two states mentioned, then in what state does it remain?

The respondent replied: “Then it shall truly abide in its own essence.”

Commentary on the Third Question and Answer

The two states mentioned earlier refer to:

  1. The state in which the soul is not engaged with external attachments, yet remains bound to the body.
  2. The state in which the soul’s faculties have fully withdrawn from external entanglements and turned inward, existing without attachment or connection to the body.

Thus, if the soul is beyond both of these states, it will abide in its own essence. This question and answer directly reference the third aphorism of the Samādhi Pāda, which states: “Thus, the seer (the realized being) abides in its own essential nature[3].”

However, the necessary condition for this realization is already outlined in the second aphorism: “Yoga, or the path of self-realization, is attained through the cessation (nirodha) of the fluctuations of the soul’s faculties (the fluctuations of consciousness).[4]”

These two aphorisms encapsulate the entire doctrine of self-realization in Patañjali’s system. The remaining Sūtras serve as elaborations and explanations of these foundational statements. Consequently, in the following question-and-answer exchange, the inquirer seeks a more detailed exposition of this concise doctrine.

Fourth Question and Answer

The inquirer said: “This response is not entirely satisfying, and I have not fully grasped it. Therefore, clarify it for me. Is anything added to or subtracted from the soul [meaning: does something increase in the soul when its faculties turn inward, and does something diminish when they turn outward]?

Just as the skin expands under rain and moisture and contracts under the heat and light of the sun, then—due to the successive and alternating states imposed upon a singular essence—the soul would be perishable and subject to decay. Or is it instead like the air, which remains unaffected by heat and cold, or like an inanimate object that undergoes no change or transformation? Yet both of these positions contradict the established doctrines regarding the soul, which affirm that the soul does not admit corruption or annihilation and is eternally alive and indestructible.”

The respondent said: “The meaning of my words is that the soul, kamā huwa huwa[5] [as it is in itself], is an independent reality. The senses and the soul’s faculties, upon returning to the soul, attain the same unity that existed at the beginning, and its being is in its completeness.”

In truth, a person perceives all that surrounds them through their senses and comprehends all that is external to them through their soul’s faculties. Therefore, when the faculties return to the soul, nothing is added to it—it remains precisely as it was before.

 

 

 

Commentary on the Fourth Question and Answer

The discussion presented in this question and answer finds no direct equivalent in the original Sūtras. It appears that al-Bīrūnī introduced this exchange independently to clarify the subject matter and facilitate a better understanding of the doctrine.

The fundamental question raised here is whether the soul undergoes any increase or diminution when its faculties turn inward or outward. More precisely, if Patañjali repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of recollecting the soul’s faculties back to the soul, two possibilities arise:

If the faculties’ return to the soul does not induce any transformation within it, then such an action would be meaningless and futile.

If the return of the faculties does bring about a change in the soul, then the soul—being a pure immaterial essence—would be subject to transformation and interaction, thereby losing its immaterial nature. In that case, it would require a hyle (prime matter) to be capable of undergoing change.

Al-Bīrūnī’s response, voiced through Patañjali, to this philosophical challenge asserts that no transformation or interaction occurs within the soul itself. Rather, the soul’s faculties, which had been engaged with external realities, merely return to their original state, thereby restoring the unity that existed from the beginning.

In other words, the faculties’ object of perception shifts—it was previously occupied with external phenomena, but upon recollection, its focus turns inward toward the soul itself. The alteration, therefore, is not in the soul but in the faculties’ orientation.

Thus, the recollection of the faculties is neither comparable to the expansion and contraction of the skin under different conditions nor to the inert constancy of a stone. Instead, it resembles the case of a person who has always carried a precious gem in their pocket yet remained unaware of it. Searching for treasure outside themselves, they ultimately reach into their pocket and discover that the jewel was with them all along.

Fifth Question and Answer

The inquirer asked: How many faculties emerge from the soul?

The respondent replied: These faculties are five in number. The first of them is perception (idrāk), which occurs in three distinct forms: Either perception through the five senses [sensory perception], Or perception through inference, derived from sensory data, such as observing smoke and deducing the presence of fire behind a wall that obstructs direct sight of it. Or perception through transmitted knowledge [testimony and consensus], whereby one attains knowledge through reliable reports from others. An example of this is our awareness that the city of Kannauj is situated on the banks of the Ganges, even though we have never seen it ourselves. This knowledge is acquired through transmission, which ultimately relies on direct observation.

The second of these faculties is imagination (takhayyul), which is a faculty of the soul that causes something to be perceived contrary to its actual reality, such as sunlight reflecting on a desert plain in a manner that makes it appear as though there is water, [when in reality, it is merely a mirage and not actual water]. 

The third is supposition (ẓann), which is an assertion that lacks actual reality and persists merely as a habitual linguistic convention. An example is the common saying that the spirit possesses life, [whereas, in reality, the spirit itself is life and not an entity upon which life is later conferred]. However, such a statement remains widely accepted due to conventional usage and is not typically challenged.

The fourth is dreams (ru’yā), wherein a person perceives something that does not actually exist, [meaning that in this particular state of the soul], there is no corresponding external reality to what is perceived.

The fifth and final faculty of the soul is memory (dukr), which is the retention and persistence of knowledge within the knower without slipping into forgetfulness or oblivion.

 

Commentary on the Fifth Question and Answer

  1. The Soul and Its Faculties in Islamic-Iranian Philosophy

Undoubtedly, the conceptualization of the soul and its faculties in Islamic philosophy differs fundamentally from what al-Bīrūnī attributes to Patañjali. The faculties of the soul in the Islamic Iran philosophical tradition of have been primarily shaped and expanded under the influence of Peripatetic thought. Not only have Muslim philosophers, but also Ṣūfīs, employed these doctrines as the framework for their discussions. Moreover, Peripatetic philosophy itself is indebted to the intellectual legacy of Aristotle.

In Islamic-Iranian philosophy, and specifically in the doctrines of Avicenna the soul is classified, based on different considerations, into vegetative (nabātī), animal (ḥayawānī), and rational (insānī) souls. The vegetative soul is the first perfection (kamāl al-awwal) of a natural organic body, enabling it to perform the functions of nourishment, growth, and reproduction. The animal soul is the first perfection of a natural organic body, granting it the faculty of sensory perception and voluntary motion. Lastly, the rational soul is the first perfection of a natural organic body, inasmuch as it possesses the capacity for intellect (‘aql) and apprehends universal concepts (kulliyāt). Since the vegetative soul is not directly relevant to Patañjali’s discussion, we set it aside. However, regarding the animal soul, its perceptive faculties are generally divided into two categories: External Senses (ḥawāss ẓāhira), and Internal Faculties (quwā bāṭiniyya).

The external senses are analyzed through the five sense faculties, whereas the internal faculties are generally identified by most philosophers as: Common sense (ḥiss mushtarak), Imagination (khayāl), Estimative faculty (wahm), Compositive faculty (mutaṣarrifa), and Memory (dhākira). Among these, common sense and estimation are receptive faculties, while imagination and memory assist the receptive faculties in preserving sensory forms and meanings. The compositive faculty, in addition to preservation, also analyzes, combines, and reconfigures both particular forms and intelligible non-sensible meanings.

The rational soul (al-nafs al-nāṭiqa) is distinguished by its capacity to apprehend intelligibles (maʻqūlāt) and its possession of the faculty of intellect (‘aql), which is further divided into the Theoretical Intellect (‘aql naẓarī) and the Practical Intellect (‘aql ‘amalī).

The theoretical intellect, which forms the foundation of theoretical wisdom (ḥikma naẓariyya), is purely receptive (qābilun li-l-fayḍ). It passively receives emanation (fayḍ) and intellectual perfections (kamālāt) from higher ontological realms. It pertains not to practical action, but rather to the comprehension of necessary, contingent, and impossible truths (wājib, mumkin, wa mumtani‘), serving as the seat of metaphysical and scientific contemplation.

The practical intellect (‘aql ‘amalī), which serves as the basis of practical wisdom (ḥikma ‘amaliyya), governs deliberation concerning human action (ta‘aqqul fi‘l al-insān). It is responsible for discerning moral and ethical values, distinguishing between permissible (mubāḥ), virtuous (ḥasan), and reprehensible (qabīḥ) acts—such as recognizing justice (al-‘adl) as good and injustice (al-ẓulm) as evil.

Avicenna delineates four levels of theoretical intellect, which, in reality, represent the stages of actualization of the rational faculty (al-quwwa al-ʻaqliyya) in human beings:

  • Material Intellect (ʻaql hayūlānī) – the state of pure potentiality, where no acquired intelligibles exist.
  • Habitual Intellect (ʻaql bi’l-malaka) – the stage of potential knowledge, where the mind acquires the first intelligibles (awāʻil al-maʻqūlāt) through abstraction.
  • Actualized Intellect (ʻaql bi’l-fiʻl) – the state in which the intellect has acquired both primary and secondary intelligibles and can readily bring them to mind.
  • Acquired Intellect (ʻaql bi’l-mustafād) – the state of perfected intellect, where all intelligibles are fully present.

The ultimate cause that facilitates the soul’s rational perfection—allowing it to traverse the stages from potentiality to actuality—is the Active Intellect (ʻaql al-faʻʻāl). The Active Intellect lies beyond the domain of the human soul, is entirely immaterial (mujarrad), and serves as the preserver of all intelligible forms for the four levels of theoretical intellect.

Despite the fact that al-Bīrūnī presents the components of the cycle of consciousness fluctuations (chitta vṛtti), which he refers to using the terms perception, imagination, supposition, dreams, and memory, as the faculties of the soul according to Hindu thought, particularly within the Yogic tradition, Patañjali’s intent regarding these five principles does not concern a classification of the soul’s faculties in the Aristotelian sense. Rather, these elements serve to articulate his distinctive approach to spiritual discipline and ascetic discipline of thought. In this sense, the most accurate rendering of Patañjali’s doctrine regarding chitta vṛtti would be the cycle of consciousness fluctuations, rather than a taxonomy of the faculties of the soul.

In Hindu epistemology, the faculties that contribute to the cognition of phenomena are instead conceptualized under the term antaḥkaraṇa (the inner instrument), which is more closely comparable to the Peripatetic understanding of the internal faculties of the soul. The analysis of human cognitive faculties within Hindu thought, particularly as expounded in Sāṃkhya Darśana and Yoga Darśana, reveals a crucial metaphysical principle: the microcosm of human cognition is fully aligned with the macrocosmic order of existence[6]. Thus, the faculties of the human soul are, at the same time, the very faculties of prakṛti (nature).

In Yogic doctrine, the mahat (cosmic intellect), asmitā (ego, I-am-ness), manas (sensory mind), and their respective faculties—such as sensory and logical perception, memory, and imagination—are collectively referred to as chitta (consciousness). In Sāṃkhya Darśana, these same faculties are subsumed under the broader category of antaḥkaraṇa (the inner cognitive faculties). As stated in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā: “Antaḥkaraṇa is threefold, while the external senses are tenfold. These faculties [both the cognitive senses and the sensory organs] serve as intermediaries, transferring external sensations to the inner faculties. The external senses operate exclusively in the present moment, whereas the inner faculties engage with the past, present, and future[7].”

The five primordial elements of creation (pañca tanmātra) provide the foundation for interaction with external existence. When these operate in a receptive manner, they constitute the cognitive faculties (jñānendriyāṇi); when they function actively, they form the motor faculties (karmendriyāṇi). Manas is responsible for receiving and processing these sensory stimuli. The five tanmātras, the motor faculties, the cognitive faculties, and manas all originate from ahaṃkāra (I-am-ness). Once manas categorizes and organizes sensory perceptions, ahaṃkāra structures them around the concept of “I-am-ness,” thereby generating and sustaining individual identity.

Furthermore, the mahat, referred to as buddhi (intellect) in the microcosm, is the first emanation from the infinite substratum of prakṛti. It encompasses all potential cosmic laws and serves as the latent seed of all intellectual and moral capabilities. The principle of clarity and balance (sattva) is more fully manifest in mahat than in any other aspect of creation, which is why it is associated with attributes such as jñāna (knowledge), dharma (primordial law), aiśvarya (sovereignty), virāga (detachment), and adhyavasāya (discernment). When buddhi is in alignment with the Cosmic Intellect, the illusion of ahaṃkāra dissipates, and the ultimate truth of existence is unveiled—namely, the distinction between puruṣa (the absolute conscious principle) and prakṛti (the mutable material principle), along with the realization of puruṣa’s transcendence beyond the fluctuations of prakṛti.

Thus, it is evident that Patañjali’s classification of cognitive states cannot be equated with the classification of the soul’s faculties in the Islamic philosophical tradition. Hindu darśanas provide little discussion on the vegetative soul, though they acknowledge certain potential faculties that emerge when prakṛti transitions from its unmanifest to its manifest state—a topic particularly explored in āyurvedic texts.

However, when comparing the animal and rational souls in the Peripatetic tradition with their counterparts in Hindu metaphysics, both similarities and differences arise. The hierarchical structure of the theoretical intellect in Avicennan philosophy aligns closely with the concept of buddhi, and just as the acquired intellect ultimately connects to the active intellect, so too does buddhi correspond to Mahat, the Cosmic Intellect in Sāṃkhya.

Meanwhile, the internal faculties of the animal soul in Peripatetic philosophy are entirely classified within a different framework in Hindu philosophy. However, certain comparisons can be drawn: manas can be equated with the common sense, smṛti with memory and imagination, and vikalpa with the compositive faculty. Nevertheless, a fundamental difference exists between these two systems. The Peripatetic classification of the faculties of the soul, rooted in Aristotelian philosophy, organizes them based on their engagement with the external world and sensory perception. In contrast, Hindu metaphysical traditions—particularly in Sāṃkhya—structure the faculties of consciousness in reverse order: beginning with the potentiality of prakṛti, progressing to buddhi, followed by ahaṃkāra, and finally leading to manas and the individual faculties of perception and action. Thus, it must be acknowledged that Patañjali’s descriptions of perception, imagination, supposition, dreams, and memory in the Yoga Sūtras are not directly comparable to the framework developed by Islamic philosophers under Aristotelian influence regarding the faculties of the soul.

  1. The Philosophical and Mystical Structure of the Five Mental Modifications (Pañca Vṛtti) in the Yoga Sūtras

A proper understanding of what Patañjali designates as the five fluctuations (pañca vṛtti) in the Yoga Sūtras necessitates recognition of the fundamental principle that, within Hindu metaphysics and mysticism, human consciousness possesses a cyclical and rotational nature (vṛttiya). This cycle either orients itself outward, toward external phenomena (sa-rūpa), or it becomes immersed within its own essence (sva-rūpa).

If the cycle of consciousness fluctuations turns inward, it centers on puruṣa—the true Self and the absolute essence of the individual. However, when it moves outward, asmitā governs the fluctuations of consciousness. If the ego assumes the central position within one’s awareness, all ensuing consciousness fluctuations become chains of bondage—rigid structures of attachment that give rise to duḥkha (suffering and affliction).

Since our true reality is the Self (ātman), which is pure being, consciousness, and bliss (sat-cit-ānanda), when the ego imperfectly fulfills our deepest existential longings, it does so in a limited and distorted manner—existence becomes bound by matter, consciousness becomes restricted to informational cognition, and bliss becomes reduced to pleasure. Consequently, we instinctively seek liberation from the constraints of this cycle—a liberation that is only attainable through psychological maturation and inner contemplation.

The fifth question and response align with aphorisms six through eleven of the first section (Samādhi Pāda) of the Yoga Sūtras. These aphorisms clarify that the cycle of consciousness fluctuations (chitta-vṛtti) is initiated by valid cognition (pramāṇa)Valid cognition itself operates through three modalities: itself functions through three modalities: Sensory perception (pratyakṣa), logical inference (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (āgama).

Aphorism seven of the Yoga Sūtras states: “Valid cognition (pramāṇa) arises through three means: direct perception (pratyakṣa), inferential reasoning (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (āgama)[8].”

Regardless of which of these three modes initiates the cycle of consciousness fluctuations /mental modifications, if puruṣa does not occupy the central position of one’s being, the individual remains alienated from their true existential ground and thus fails to partake in the higher states of existence. This is why the next stage in the consciousness /mental fluctuation is imagination (viparyaya), which signifies a distortion of perception and is the first misalignment from sva-rūpa (one’s true existential mode, which entails absolute knowledge and ecstatic love). The prefix “Vi-” denotes expansion, and “Pari-” signifies separation or deviation. Thus, viparyaya represents a departure from the true existential mode (sva-rūpa), which results in cognitive fragmentation.

This cognitive rupture leads to conceptualisation (vikalpa), which then transitions into sleep (nidrā), and ultimately culminates in memory (smṛti).

To clarify this concept, let us consider a simple analogy: Imagine a stick submerged in water. Due to refraction, one perceives the stick as being bent within the water. At this stage, there is a direct sensory perception that suggests the stick is broken. This marks the initial level of valid cognition (pramāṇa), even though it is flawed due to the limitations of sense perception.

At this point, we attempt to correct our observation by distancing ourselves from our immediate sensory experience (viparyaya) and seeking a more accurate framework for interpretation—such as the laws of light refraction (vikalpa).

It is essential to note that the Sanskrit term vikalpa, which is often rendered as conceptualisation, derives from the root “kalpa”, meaning to conform or configure, while the prefix “vi– “signifies divergence or alternative structuring. Thus, even though our direct experience tells us that the stick is bent, we intellectually recognize that this is an illusion and that the stick remains straight outside of the water.

Sleep (nidrā) is the state in which nothing is perceived at all—just as, in this analogy, the straight stick is not seen while submerged, even though it exists unchanged. This absence of perception leads to memory (smṛti), which allows us to recall past experiences and, in subsequent situations, avoid misjudgment—thus, when we see another stick in water, we no longer assume that it is broken.

Naturally, Patañjali’s intent in discussing the five vṛttis is not limited to such physical phenomena, but rather aims to describe the cyclical patterns of human cognition and the psychological mechanisms that condition our perception of reality.

Since human essence is inherently pure and intrinsically complete, whenever he encounters incomplete or distorted cognition, he instinctively attempts to compensate for its deficiencies by reconstructing an alternate mental paradigm. However, rather than leading to authentic knowledge, this process draws him deeper into illusion and solidifies mental structures that obstruct direct self-awareness. True gnosis (vidyā) is only attained when one redirects awareness inward and realigns cognition with its original ontological ground (sva-rūpa).

  1. Defining the Five Mental Modifications (Pañca Vṛtti) According to the Yoga Sūtras and al-Bīrūnī’s Interpretation

(a) Idrāk (Pramāṇa) 

In Sanskrit, pramāṇa is a compound term consisting of the prefix “pra-“ (exalted, accurate) and the root “mā-” (to measure or ascertain). Thus, pramāṇa denotes valid knowledge or correct judgment. As previously mentioned, valid cognition manifests through three modalities: sensory perception, logical inference, and scriptural or testimonial knowledge.

In vedic logic (nyāya), five essential components define any act of cognition: the cognizing subject (pramātṛ), the object of cognition (prameya), the cognition itself (pramā), the means of cognition (pramāṇa), and the validity of cognition (prāmāṇya).

(b) Takhayyul (Viparyaya)

It is commonly translated in the Yoga Sūtras as misconception; however, its true meaning is more nuanced. Moreover, al-Bīrūnī’s use of the term takhayyul (imagination) in this context does not correspond to the definition of imagination (khayāl) in Islamic philosophical terminology. The eighth aphorism of the Yoga Sūtras states: “viparyaya is false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna) that does not correspond to the true form (rūpa) of the object[9].”

In al-Bīrūnī’s rendering, he illustrates this concept through the example of a mirage—where one falsely perceives water in the desert.

(c) Zann (Vikalpa)

In this mode of cognition, there is no actual referent (viṣaya), and the knowledge thus produced is entirely artificial or imaginary. The ninth aphorism of the Samādhi Pāda provides a definition of vikalpa: “Vikalpa is verbal or conceptual knowledge (śabda-jñāna) that pertains to an empty and non-existent object[10].”

(d) Ru’yā (Nidrā)

Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that in modern usage, rū’yā (often translated as “dream”) generally refers to a specific phase of sleep in which dream imagery occurs, whereas deep sleep is characterized by an absence of such imagery. In Sanskrit terminology, the dream state is referred to as svapna, while deep sleep is termed nidra, which literally means “not seeing anything.”

Thus, in the present context, rū’yā, as used by al-Bīrūnī, refers to nidra—the state of dreamless deep sleep. Al-Bīrūnī’s definition also affirms this interpretation: “It is a mode of human cognition that perceives what does not exist, such that there is no corresponding reality to that which is known in this state.[11]”

Patañjali likewise provides an analogous definition in the Yoga Sūtras: “Nidra is a fluctuation (vṛtti) that rests upon (ālambana) the absence (abhāva) of mental impressions (pratyaya)[12].”

(e) Dhukr (Smṛti)

The eleventh aphorism of the Samādhi Pāda defines Smṛti as follows: “Memory (smṛti) is the non-forgetting (asaṃpramoṣaḥ) of experienced objects (viṣaya) that have been perceived (anubhūta)[13].”

This definition suggests that memory serves as the faculty responsible for retaining and preserving past experiences, preventing them from being lost to forgetfulness.

Sixth Question and Answer

The questioner said: How can the soul be subdued, and how can its faculties be withdrawn from external engagements and turned inward?

The respondent said: This is possible through two methods. The first is the practical path, which consists in habituating the soul [to negation of thought]. Whenever a person directs themselves toward one of the faculties of the soul, striving with diligence to restrain it from disobedience and persistently conditioning it toward the more virtuous act [that is, turning inward] the soul gradually becomes accustomed to [negation of thought]. However, at times, the possibility remains that between these two states [the moment when attention is directed outward and the moment when it returns inward] a lapse may occur, causing the soul to turn toward what is unworthy. Yet, through continuity and persistent effort, this susceptibility is eliminated. Ultimately, that faculty of the soul will have no alternative but to settle into what it has become accustomed to through disciplined exertion, and thus, it will abandon its former waywardness and return inward.

The second method is the intellectual path, which constitutes a form of ascetic discipline of the intellect (al-zuhd al-fikrī), attained through deep reflection and inner witnessing of the inevitable perishing of all transient beings and phenomena. And indeed, there is nothing worse than annihilation and decay. Through this ascetic discipline of thought, the impermanence and corruption of all beings are laid bare and fully revealed. The consequence of this path is that when one recognizes the inherent evil and baseness in all worldly phenomena, their heart grows disillusioned and weary of all aspirations—both worldly and otherworldly. The soul is thus liberated from the pursuit of such aspirations, neither seeking them nor desiring anything from them.

Our desires and aspirations are the very causes and sources of attachment to worldly beings; they are superfluous burdens and afflictions that ensnare us, forming the very shackles that bind us within the realm of existence. They serve as veils and obstructions on the path to purification and sincerity, preventing us from attaining ultimate liberation. When a person has completely uprooted all greed (ṭamaʻ[14]) toward the world and all that it contains, they ascend beyond the level of the first three faculties (al-quwā al-thalāth al-ūlā), from which no realm of existence [indeed, no single being] is devoid.

These first three faculties pertain to the processes of generation and emergence on one side of nature (Rajas) and to corruption and dissolution on the other (Tamas). Both formation and decay are inherent within nature, and one who positions themselves in the middle between these two partakes of both, thereby attaining the ability to govern and regulate them (Sattva). However, true transcendence is only realized when these three faculties are entirely eradicated.

 

Commentary on the Sixth Question and Answer

In this discourse, the fundamental question concerns the path by which an individual, striving for liberation, may break free from the bondage of nature—an endeavor that is only attainable through the inward turning of the soul’s faculties. According to the response given, there are two possible approaches to this liberation: The Practical Path, and the Intellectual Path.

The practical path consists of training the soul’s faculties to withdraw from external distractions and return to the inner self (meditative discipline/ perseverant effort in meditation /diligent spiritual discipline). The intellectual path, on the other hand, entails profound contemplation on the transience of all natural phenomena, recognizing that whatever has entered the domain of existence is inevitably destined for annihilation. Fundamentally, the recognition of death and decay alongside every instance of blossoming in nature serves as the very key to the ascetic discipline of thought (al-zuhd al-fikrī).

The discussion presented here is an interpretative rendering of the twelfth to fifteenth sūtras of the first section (Samādhi Pāda) of the Yoga Sūtras as understood by al-Bīrūnī. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine these sūtras in light of the original Sanskrit text as well as other exegetical traditions in order to clarify the matter to the fullest extent.

The first point that must be emphasized is that the practical and intellectual paths function as two complementary wings of the journey inward; neither can, in isolation, bring about nirodha (cessation of the fluctuations of consciousness). Patañjali states in the twelfth sūtra: “Through abhyāsa (disciplined effort / perseverant effort in meditation) and vairāgya (detachment), nirodha is attained.[15]”

However, al-Bīrūnī’s interpretation suggests that liberation is possible through either the intellectual or the practical approach: “It is achieved by two paths: one is practical (ʻamalī)… and the second is intellectual (ʻaqlī).[16]” Yet, within the sūtras, abhyāsa and vairāgya are not two separate alternatives but rather two inseparable components of the same process of achieving nirodha.

Al-Bīrūnī translates the practical path as the training of the soul’s faculties through “the negation of idle thoughts” (nafy al-khāṭir), which must be realized through perseverance and continuity on one hand, and effort and determination on the other. This directly corresponds to the subject of the thirteenth sūtra: “The realization of abhyāsa is established through effort (yatna) and steadfastness (sthiti)[17].” However, further elaboration is provided in the fourteenth sūtra of the Yoga Sūtras, outlining four essential qualities of abhyāsa:

  • Long Duration (dīrgha-kāla): Abhyāsa bears fruit only when practiced consistently over an extended period.
  • Uninterrupted Continuity (nairantarya): It must be pursued without interruption.
  • Balance and Equanimity (sat-kāra): The practice must be performed in a state of harmony (sattva-guṇa), avoiding excesses of rājas (restless activity) and tamas (lethargy).
  • Psychological Maturity (dṛḍha-Bhūmi): True abhyāsa arises from an existential necessity and an inner spiritual urgency.

What al-Bīrūnī refers to as the intellectual path and the ascetic discipline of thought (al-zuhd al-fikrī) is a translation of the Sanskrit vairāgya, which is commonly rendered as “detachment.”

Al-Bīrūnī’s explanation elegantly captures Patañjali’s intent, stating that the realization of vairāgya arises from direct insight into the impermanence and dissolution of all things—recognizing the negation inherent within every affirmation. In doing so, one becomes free not only from attachment to what is seen (dṛṣṭa) but also from clinging to what has only been heard (anuśravika), such as inherited beliefs and second-hand doctrines.

The final point addressed by al-Bīrūnī in this discussion—though some words from his manuscript are missing at this juncture[18], leaving his phrasing somewhat disjointed—corresponds to the sixteenth sūtra[19]. Here, the concept of supreme liberation (parama-vairāgya) is articulated as the transcendence of the three primordial faculties (tri–guṇa), which are present in all realms of existence.

This notion is echoed across numerous Hindu mystical texts. For instance, chapter fourteen of the Bhagavad Gītā expounds in detail on these three fundamental faculties, stating that sattva (purity and harmony) leads to clarity, contentment, and lightness, rajas (passion and activity) manifests as effort, desire, and agitation, and, tamas (darkness and inertia) results in ignorance, dullness, and stagnation. However, despite these explanations, the final verse of the Gītā explicitly affirms that:

“One who, with unwavering devotion, takes refuge in Me

And transcends the bondage of the guṇas,

Is worthy of attaining the Supreme Brahman.

For I am the abode of Brahman,

The eternal wellspring of immortality.

I am the inexhaustible essence of liberation,

And the infinite sovereign of all!”

 

This passage unequivocally asserts that true liberation is attained only by transcending all three guṇas. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, the fluctuations of prakṛti arise from the interplay of these three fundamental forces, and spiritual liberation (mokṣa) is attained only by transcending the three guṇas and realizing puruṣa as distinct from prakṛti. Sattva embodies awareness, balance, and illumination; rajas signifies energy, striving, and desire; and tamas represents inertia, ignorance, and stagnation. As al-Bīrūnī interprets, true liberation is not merely renunciation but transcending the subtlest veils of cosmic dynamism.

  1. Conclusion

This article is a selected excerpt from the author’s broader research on al-Bīrūnī’s Patanjal al-Hindī fī al-khalāṣ min al-irtibāk, published as an independent book. The book includes a complete Persian translation of al-Bīrūnī’s treatise, a direct translation of Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras from Sanskrit, and a comparative analysis of the two. While this article analyzes only six key question-and-answer dialogues from al-Bīrūnī’s text, it offers a focused lens through which to explore his interpretive strategy and philosophical alignment with both Islamic-Iranian and Indian mystical traditions.

This study demonstrates that Patanjal al-Hindī is not merely a literal translation of the Yoga Sūtras, but a profound reworking of Yogic ideas into the epistemological and metaphysical frameworks of Islamic philosophy. Al-Bīrūnī presents complex Indian concepts in a rational, structured format suitable for his intended audience, revealing significant parallels between Yogic doctrines and Islamic Sufism. Concepts such as the nature of mental fluctuations, the faculties of the soul, perception and misperception, and the path to liberation all show remarkable points of resonance despite fundamental doctrinal differences.

One of the most significant contrasts lies in the classification of the faculties of the soul. While Islamic Peripatetic philosophy, shaped by Aristotelian logic, begins with the sensory faculties and proceeds inward, Indian traditions such as Sāṃkhya and Yoga offer an inverse hierarchy: beginning with prakṛti as pure potentiality, followed by buddhi (intellect), ahaṃkāra (egoic individuality), and manas (mind). The ultimate aim is not cognition of the external world, but transcendence of all cognitive structures toward realization of pure consciousness (puruṣa), understood in Yogic terms as sat (pure being), chit (pure consciousness), and ānanda (bliss).

A critical philological insight emerging from this research is the strong possibility that al-Bīrūnī’s source was not Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtras alone, but the Yoga Bhāṣya—Vyāsa’s seminal commentary. This may explain the presence of elaborated doctrines and philosophical arguments not explicitly found in the terse Sūtras themselves. If so, Patanjal al-Hindī would stand as the earliest known rendering of the Yoga Bhāṣya outside of India, further emphasizing its historical importance.

Methodologically, this study demonstrates the potential of comparative philosophy to foster meaningful cross-cultural engagement. Al-Bīrūnī’s method—interpreting foreign metaphysical systems through the lens of his own intellectual tradition without distorting their essence—can serve as a model for modern comparative scholarship.

This kind of comparative mystical inquiry contributes to broader contemporary discourses on cross-cultural hermeneutics, inter-religious philosophy, and the epistemology of spiritual traditions. By engaging deeply with both Yogic and Islamic frameworks, this study lays the groundwork for future explorations into how ancient traditions addressed universal metaphysical concerns—and how those insights may continue to inform modern philosophical inquiry.

 

References:

  1. Hauer, J. W. (1930). Das neugefundene arabische Manuskript von al-Bı¯ru¯nı¯s Übersetzung des Pa¯tañjala (Ein vorläufiger Bericht). Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, 33(4), 273–282.
  2. Massignon, Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane, Paris, 1922, 79; second ed., Paris, 1954, 97.
  3. Ritter, H., 1956. al-Bīrūnī’s übersetzung des Yoga-Sūtra des Patañjali. Oriens, pp.165-200.
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Notes:

[1] The term irtibāk is derived from the ifti‘āl verbal form of the root r-b-k. As mentioned in al-Munjid: “Irtabaka fī al-amr wa lam yakad yatakhallaṣu minhu“, meaning “he became entangled in a matter from which he could barely free himself.” Thus, irtibāk signifies entrapment, entanglement, or being caught in a difficult situation. In this context, it refers to the soul’s captivity within the prison of the material world.

[2] Kitāb al-Hind, p. 66

[3] Yoga Sūtra, 1.3: Tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe’vasthānam

[4] Yoga Sūtra, 1.2: Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ

[5] Arabic: «کَما هوَ هوَ»

“kamā huwa huwa” — This phrase literally means “as it is in itself,” indicating an essential, unchanging reality.

[6] The correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm has been a widely accepted perspective in the mystical teachings of the East, with numerous Vedic texts explicitly and extensively referencing this concept.

[7] Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, 33

[8]Yoga Sūtra, 1.7: Pratyakṣa-anumāna-agamāḥ-pramāṇāni.

[9] Yoga Sūtra, 1.8: Viparyayo mithya-jñānam-atad-rūpa-pratiṣṭham.

[10] Yoga Sūtra, 1.9: Śabda jñāna-anupātī-vastu-śūnyo-vikalpaḥ.

[11] This phrase appears in al-Bīrūnī’s text as:

«…و هي معرفه الانسان مالیس و کذلک لاحقيقه له قائمه في حال تلک المعرفه بازائه»

“wa hiya ma‘rifat al-insān mā laysa wa ka-dhālika lā ḥaqīqata lahu qā’imatun fī ḥāl tilka al-ma‘rifa bi-azā’ihā.”

 

[12] Yoga Sūtra, 1.10: Abhāva-pratyaya-alambanā vṛttir nidrā.

[13] Yoga Sūtra, 1.11: Anubhūta-viṣaya-asampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ.

[14] Arabic: “ṭamaʻ” — Typically translated as “greed” or “desire,” in this context it refers to deep existential yearning or attachment to worldly and otherworldly outcomes, which according to the text, must be relinquished for spiritual liberation.

[15] Yoga Sūtra, 1.12: Abhyāsa-vairāgyābhyāṁ tan-nirodhaḥ.

[16] “This phrase appears in al-Bīrūnī’s text as:

«يكون بطريقين: احد هما عملئ … و الطريق الثاني عقلی…»

 “yakūnu bi-ṭarīqayn: aḥaduhumā ‘amalī … wa al-ṭarīq al-thānī ‘aqlī.”

 

[17] Yoga Sūtra, 1.13: Tatra sthitau yatno’bhyāsaḥ.

[18] Certain words in al-Bīrūnī’s manuscript are damaged or missing, and they are marked with question marks (؟) in the text to indicate the uncertainty in their reconstruction.

«… وهی المکوِّنه فی طرف الطبیعة و المفسدة فی طرفها الآخرهما (؟) طرفین (؟) فی جنسیهما و المتوسط بینهما آخذ من کلیهما…»

 (… wa hiya al-mukawwinatu fī ṭaraf al-ṭabī‘a wa al-mufsidatu fī ṭarfi-hā al-ākhirahumā (?) ṭarafayn (?) fī jinsayhimā wa al-mutawassiṭu baynahumā ākhidhun min kulay-himā...)

[19] Yoga Sūtra, 1.16: Tatparaṁ puruṣa khyāter guṇa vaitṛṣṇyam